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Abstract
Self-report items are ubiquitous in social sciences and services and medical
centers. However, there is some concern of whether people are able to accurately report
about themselves. One well-known source of concern is social desirability bias (SDB) or
socially desirable responding (SDR), which involves people providing overly-positive
responses about themselves that better align with social norms than might their actual
attitudes or behaviors. However, several researchers (e.g., Brenner & DeLamater, 2016;
Hadaway et al., 1998) suggest that a person’s identity in the area of interest may bias
their responding. Specifically, that people interpret and respond to items in terms of the
standards of their important identities, effectively, their ideal selves.
The present study investigated whether having participants in the experimental
condition respond to items first in terms of their ideal selves may then enable them to
respond more accurately about their actual selves. Five different self-report scales were
used along with indirect measures and measures of identity importance (each of which
corresponded to the topic measured by the self-report scales). Participants in the
experimental condition responded to each item twice, in terms of their ideal then actual
selves. Participants in the control condition responded to all items once, as in traditional
survey response formats. Ideal and actual-self responses were compared to responses
from the control condition. Results indicate that the ideal self might influence responding
but does not seem to be the sole basis (i.e., people may not necessarily self-report in
terms of their ideal selves).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Self-report items are ubiquitous throughout social sciences and social services and
are also common in medical centers and clinics. Broadly, these items are used to index
attitudes, beliefs, and social perceptions, as well as behaviors, traits, and experiences. In
many cases, self-report items are used when directly observing the construct is not
feasible, may cost more time or money, and/or requires an amount of time, effort, or
commitment from participants that decreases the participation rate. Examples include
measuring attitudes, extroversion, eating habits, or average exercise frequency in a
month. Additionally, there are some research areas in which random assignment and
experimental manipulation may be unethical (e.g., smoking, abuse) or impossible (e.g.,
religious belief, attachment in childhood). Administering self-report items is relatively
easy and low-cost and reduces the issues of feasibility and ethics that can be associated
with laboratory experiments. However, the accuracy of self-report measures is sometimes
criticized due to concerns of whether people can correctly and truthfully report on
themselves.
From a measurement perspective, one well-known source of self-report
inaccuracy is social desirability bias (SDB) or socially desirable responding (SDR), in
that respondents present themselves in an overly positive, socially favorable light
(Paulhus, 2002). Such biased responding can distort the relationship between variables
such as by (1) causing a spurious relationship between X and Y by correlating with each,
(2) hiding an extant relationship between X and Y, such that without removing SDB they
appear unrelated, and (3) moderating the X-Y relationship such that the X-Y relationship
differs depending on the level of SDB (Ganster et al., 1983).
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Sometimes social desirability is a temporary bias known as a response set that is
elicited by situational factors. Here, SDR is attributed to the sensitivity of questions.
Sensitive questions include those that inquire about discrepancy from social norms,
provoke concerns about the consequences of responding honestly, or intrude into private
matters that some people feel should not be the subject of research (Tourangeau & Yan,
2007). Responses to sensitive questions, if not omitted, are often more biased than nonsensitive questions. Socially desirable responding can also exist as a response style for
some individuals, biasing their responses across items and surveys regardless of their
sensitivity. That is, some people may be dispositionally inclined towards presenting
themselves in an overly positive, socially desirable manner. Rather than conceiving this
as people deliberately lying, Paulhus (2002) advances that consistent, exceedingly
positive self-presentation may sometimes be more of a personality characteristic.
Crowne and Marlowe (1964) attribute socially desirable responding to the need
for social approval and acceptance. Indeed, SDR tends to be reduced when respondents
answer questions either on paper or online, rather than via interview, especially when
anonymity and confidentiality are ensured (e.g., Durmaz et al., 2020). Interestingly,
however, socially desirable responding is still found when questions are answered
privately, anonymously, and confidentially. One explanation for this is that SDR has two
factors, as has been found by Paulhus (2002) and other researchers. One factor –
impression management – reflects response distortions of which respondents were likely
aware (i.e., they knew their responses were false). Ensuring privacy and anonymity can
diminish impression management. The other factor – self-deceptive enhancement –
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concerns overly positive self-reports that respondents genuinely believe, and therefore
cannot be mitigated by having participants respond anonymously.
Brenner and DeLamater (2016) offer a new way of understanding self-report bias
that is rooted in Identity Theory and Self-Discrepancy Theory. At a basic level, Brenner
and DeLamater suggest that self-report bias results from people subconsciously
reinterpreting self-report items to be about identity, or “the kind of person” that one is
(Brenner, 2017, p. 560). It can be challenging for a person to regularly embody the person
they desire to be, and may be at their best, including engaging in certain behaviors,
maintaining particular beliefs or attitudes, or sustaining a given outlook or disposition.
Survey items may offer respondents a low-cost opportunity to express this ideal version
of themselves. The ideal self represents the type of person one thinks it’s important to be,
including the associated attributes and behaviors, within a given identity (e.g., parent,
student, citizen, etc.). For example, a survey question about frequency of attendance to
religious services may be reinterpreted as asking about one’s identity as a religious
person rather than their behavior. As such, respondents might report the frequency that
best aligns with their religious identity regardless of their actual attendance (Hadaway et
al., 1998). Otherwise stated, they might report their ideal-self associated with their
religious identity (Brenner, 2017).
If people are able to express their ideal selves via responding to self-report items,
might they then, subsequently, be able to provide responses that better reflect how they
actually are (i.e., their actual selves)? That is, if people respond in terms of their ideal
selves first, they may then be more willing or able to provide more accurate responses.
The present study is aimed at investigating this possibility.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Self-report items are questions or statements to which people respond with
information about themselves (e.g., attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors). These items
are ubiquitous in many areas of the social sciences, including sociology, education,
economics, political science, and numerous branches of psychology. Self-report items are
also used in social-service and medical settings, inquiring about a person’s health
behaviors (e.g., exercise, drug use, eating habits, sleep patterns), possible symptoms, and
other experiences.
Self-report items are often selected for their ease of use and ethicality. That is, it
is often easier, faster, and less expensive to ask people about themselves than to gather
observational or other forms of data. Additionally, there are some areas in which
experimental measurement with random assignment may be unethical (e.g., smoking,
abuse), or impossible (e.g., religious belief, attitudes, attachment in childhood). In these
cases, self-report measurement often is, or is part of, the alternative form of
measurement. However, the accuracy of self-report measures is sometimes criticized due
to concerns of whether people can correctly and truthfully report on themselves (e.g.,
Buchanan, 2016; Christian et al., 2020; Darrow et al., 2002; Gomes et al. 2019; NavarroGonzalez et al., 2016; Schwarz, 1999; Williams et al., 2016).
From a measurement perspective, one popular and well-known concern is social
desirability (SD; social desirability bias, SDB; or socially desirable responding, SDR).
Early conceptualizations of SDR involved responses made in a manner that was
culturally acceptable and sanctioned (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Damarin & Messick,
1965). More recently, Paulhus (2002) also explicated that, for any measure of SDR,
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sufficient evidence should be provided to demonstrate that high scores indicate deviations
from reality (i.e., that socially desirable responses on the measure are untrue). Here, SDR
is presentation of oneself in an overly positive, favorable light (Paulhus, 2002). Social
desirability is understood to have at least two dimensions – impression management and
self-deceptive enhancement – which differ in terms of respondent belief or awareness
(e.g.,Damarin & Messick, 1965; Paulhus, 2002; Sackeim & Gur, 1978; Wiggins, 1964)1.
Impression management is thought to be conscious and intentional self-idealization.
Conversely, self-deceptive enhancement refers to overly positive self-reports that
respondents genuinely believe.
Crowne and Marlowe (1964) attribute SDR to the need for social approval and
acceptance. Indeed, SDR seems to be greater when the questions are asked via in-person
or phone interviews (i.e., in the presence of others). Conversely, having respondents
answer questions either on paper or online tends to reduce SDR, especially when
anonymity and confidentiality are ensured (e.g., Durmaz et al., 2020). However, these
strategies do not necessarily eliminate socially desirable responding, as SDR is still found
when questions are answered privately, anonymously, and confidentially (Gnambs &
Kaspar, 2017; Hancock & Flowers, 2001; Lelkes et al., 2012).
Social desirability can be understood as either a response set or a response style
(Paulhus, 2002). As a response set, socially desirable responding is short-lived and
temporary. Individuals may generally provide honest responses but due to situational
factors (e.g., sensitive questions) may respond to certain surveys or particular items in a

1

The factors have been given a variety of names. Here, I will use the nomenclature from Paulhus (1984).
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socially desirable way (e.g., Arnold & Feldman, 1981; Tourangeau & Yan, 2007). As a
response style, SDR is more pervasive, biasing responses across items and surveys.
Whether a response set or style, social desirability can cause systematic error,
distorting the relationships among variables. Ganster et al. (1983) laid out three models
reflecting three different ways in which SDR can affect the relationship between
variables:
•

The spurious model, in which SDR causes a spurious relationship between
unrelated variables such that they appear related. For example, weekly alcohol
consumption and attitudes on abortion may be unrelated but are each related to
socially desirable responding. Without including SDR in the model, the variance
that alcohol consumption and abortion attitudes each share with SDR would
mistakenly appear to be shared with each other and the variables would thus seem
related. One can test this model by partialling out SDR and examining whether
the partial correlation between the variables is near zero.

•

The suppression model, wherein SDR suppresses or masks the extant relationship
between two variables such that they erroneously appear unrelated. For example,
certain attitudes may predict voting behavior, but SDR on the attitude measure
and/or the voting behavior measure can mask their relationship.

•

The moderator model, where SDR moderates the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables such that the IV-DV relationship differs
across levels of SDR. For example, X and Y show a moderate relationship. The
X-SDR correlation is negligible so neither the spuriousness nor suppression
model can account for the finding. Further inspection finds an interaction between
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X and SDR such that for those who score high on SDR there is a strong positive
X-Y relationship, for those who score low on SDR there is a somewhat negative
X-Y relationship, and for those with mid-level scores of SDR the X-Y
relationship is moderate and positive.
While having people respond to surveys independently and ensuring anonymity and
confidentiality tends to reduce SDR, these strategies do not necessarily eliminate socially
desirable responding, as SDR is still found when questions are answered privately,
anonymously, and confidentially (Gnambs & Kaspar, 2017; Hancock & Flowers, 2001;
Lelkes et al., 2012). This suggests that factors other than the need for approval may be
eliciting biased self-reports.
Identity as a Source of Measurement Bias
Brenner and DeLamater (2016) suggest a new way of understanding self-report
bias such as SDB based on Identity Theory and Self-Discrepancy Theory. At a basic
level, Brenner and DeLamater suggest that self-report bias results from people
reinterpreting self-report items to be about identity, or “the kind of person” that one is
(Brenner, 2017, p. 560). For example, survey questions about religious service attendance
may be reinterpreted as asking about one’s identity as a religious person rather than about
their behavior (Hadaway et al., 1998). A person might value piety and consider
themselves to be a “good Christian,” but, for various reasons, may only attend religious
services once a month. However, when responding to a survey item about religious
service attendance, this person might report that they attend “at least once a week,” which
better reflects their religious identity. Survey items, then, offer respondents an
opportunity to express an important identity.
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A person has as many identities as there are domains or areas in their life (e.g.,
child, friend, associate, soccer player, religious person; Brenner & DeLamater, 2016;
McConnell, 2011). In some theories, important identities reflect an ideal version of
oneself (e.g., Brenner et al., 2014; Brenner & DeLamater, 2016). Within a given identity
(e.g., parent, student, citizen, etc.), the ideal self effectively represents the qualities,
attributes, and behaviors that one values; the type of person one thinks it is important to
be, aspires to be, or wishes they were. For example, a person may believe that, as a
parent, it is important that they be firm and consistent (attributes) and enforce the rules
and consequences they have established for their child (behavior). Their ideal parent-self
would consistently enforce the rules across situations and carry out firm consequences
whenever the rules are broken.
The ideal self is thought to serve as one evaluation guide or standard (Higgins,
1987; Stets & Burke, 2000) to which the actual self is compared. The actual self is made
up of the attributes and behaviors that an individual believes they possess and display on
a regular basis. For example, in contrast to the parent’s ideal self, their actual self may
only enforce the rules about half of the time and carry out consequences sporadically. In
addition to the ideal and actual selves, there is also an ought self that represents who,
what, and how the person believes they should be (Higgins, 1987). The ought self reflects
the duties and obligations that have been internalized from external sources such as
important others, social groups, and overall cultural norms and values. However, social
norms and values can be internalized and become reflected in one’s ideal self (Brenner &
DeLamater, 2016). Because of this overlap between the ideal and ought selves, and for
simplicity’s sake, the current work will focus on the ideal and actual selves.
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In the following paragraphs I will first discuss relevant theories of identity. In
doing so I will point out connections with social desirability, and how responding in a
socially desirable manner and responding in terms of an important identity – specifically,
one’s ideal self – might yield the same results. The broad distinction between the two
ways of responding seems to be in their underlying reasons for self-report bias. SDB
researchers take the perspective that people are “faking good” (whether through
deliberate attempts to deceive or because they genuinely believe their overly positive
self-descriptions). In contrast, identity perspectives consider self-report bias to stem from
the broader processes of how people think about, understand, and see themselves.
Theories of Identity
There are a variety of theoretical perspectives on identity. Brenner and DeLamater
(2016) focus on Identity Theory and Self-Discrepancy Theory when examining the
effects of identity on self-reports. I believe it is useful to include three additional
theoretical perspectives that complement Identity and Self-Discrepancy theories: selfschemata, self-enhancement, and self-verification. Many of the qualities in the five
theories overlap with and have implications for each other. Here I will introduce and
discuss self-schemata, self-enhancement, self-verification, and identity theory. This
discussion will include implications for self-report and ties to social desirability, where
applicable.
Self-Schemata
Self-schemata theory (Markus, 1977) concerns the cognitive structure of selfknowledge and processing of self-relevant information. There are a variety of theories on
the structure and organization of self-knowledge (e.g., Kihlstrom et al., 1988; Leary &
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Tangney, 2011; McConnell, 2011; Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2011). Like general
cognitive-representation theories, the various self-knowledge theories are unlikely to be
mutually exclusive (e.g., Anderson, 2015; Kihlstrom et al., 1988). This may be a lead
reason why self-schemata theory blends concepts of schemas and associative networks. I
will thus focus on self-schemata theory due to its theory integration, evidentiary support,
and ready ties to Identity Theory (e.g., Brenner & DeLamater, 2016; Stryker & Serpe,
1994).
Self-schemata theory advances that self-knowledge is stored in network structures
called schemata or schemas. In general, schemas are cognitive structures that represent
knowledge categories. They contain generalized knowledge of a particular domain (e.g.,
family, school, politics, a geographical region, etc.) such as common attributes of the
category and the relationships among them (Taylor & Croker, 1981). Knowledge
structures of self-relevant domains are called self-schemata; each self-schema makes up
the person’s identity in that domain (Markus, 1977). Attributes associated with one
domain can also be associated with another domain such that self-schemas can overlap
greatly or be highly distinct (Linville, 1985, 1987).
The content of the self-schema informs what the person attends to (i.e., schemarelevant/consistent information), how information is processed, whether and how the
information is remembered, as well as how the person will behave (Oyserman et al.,
2011). Information that is consistent with that in the activated self-schema (i.e., schemaconsistent information) is better attended to, is more quickly and deeply processed, and is
better remembered than schema-inconsistent information (Markus et al., 1982; Markus,
1983). Activated schemas also guide memory inferences such that gaps or lapses in
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memory can be inferentially filled by knowledge connected with the schema (i.e.,
common traits, attributes, behaviors associated with the domain; Anderson, 2015). For
example, people may have a schema for kitchen that likely includes the most expected
kitchen items (e.g., a fridge, oven, pots and pans, toaster, cutting board, plates, etc.). If a
person with this kitchen schema were briefly shown a kitchen and then asked about its
contents, they would likely remember the things they expected to be in the kitchen – the
kitchen schema-consistent information (e.g., pots and pans, toaster, cutting board).
Further, the person may also report having seen items that are commonly associated with
kitchens but were not actually present in the kitchen they observed. The kitchen they
were shown may have included a bowling ball, twin bell alarm clock, roller-skates, or
any other object not typically associated with kitchens and thus unlikely to be in a
person’s kitchen schema. These schema-irrelevant items could be ignored and thus not
recalled. However, schema-irrelevant items can be surprising to people and are in turn
more salient, which can improve their memory for the object (Niepel et al., 1994).
Broadly, self-schemata seem to function similarly to general schema (e.g., Gillihan &
Farah, 2005; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989) where, broadly, people are resistant to
information that opposes or is inconsistent with their self-schema (Markus, 1977; Markus
et al., 1982)2. In terms of self-report, if a survey includes items for which the respondent
does not have self-relevant information readily retrievable, their self-schema could guide
inferences about how they might feel or act.
The prevailing social circumstances and the individual’s motivational state
influence which self-schema are most active or accessible; salient, schema-relevant

2

Research is still needed on the effect of surprising self-schema-irrelevant stimuli on memory.
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stimuli in the environment can automatically make self-schemata more active as well
(Markus, 1983). For example, a parent would likely be schematic for parenting (i.e., have
a parent self-schema). Parenting-related stimuli activate the parent self-schema, for
example, their child entering the room. When the parent-schema is activated, the stored
information of that schema becomes more readily available, including knowledge and
beliefs (e.g., their parenting philosophy, beliefs about discipline), attributes (e.g., fair,
strict, warm, patient), and behaviors (e.g., making eye-contact with their child, hugging).
Activated schema direct attention to schema-relevant information, influence how
information is processed and interpreted, and whether information will be incorporated
into the schema (Markus, 1977; Kihlstrom et al., 1988). For example, an activated parent
self-schema might direct the individual’s attention to their child’s behavior. If the parent
self-schema includes strict as an attribute, the individual may be more likely to interpret
their child’s actions as misbehavior.
A self-schema informs, if not determines, what a person is able to report about
themself in the given domain. As such, the processes that influence self-schemata may in
turn influence how and what people self-report. Self-enhancement and self-verification
are two main motivated processes that influence self-schemata (Guenther et al., 2016);
more specifically, how self-schemata are formed and maintained (e.g., what is included
and excluded from the schema) and how they function (e.g., the information that is
sought out, attended to, and maintained). As I discuss next, self-enhancement and selfverification can bias the contents and organization of self-schema, and peoples’ selfreports in turn, to be overly positive and self-confirming.
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Self-Enhancement and Self-Verification
Self-enhancement and self-verification are motivated processes that inform the
formation, maintenance, and thus functioning of the self-schemata that make up a
person’s identities. Self-enhancement is the process and outcome of constructing as
positive a self-image as possible (Krueger, 1998, 2007); self-verification (in terms of selfverification theory, Swann, 1983, 1987, 1996) is the process of eliciting feedback that
affirms one’s view of themself. People are motivated chiefly by self-enhancement and
self-verification, such that self-enhancement can motivate them to establish positive selfviews and self-verification then works to confirm their enhanced self-views (Diener &
Diener, 1995; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). This is true in collectivistic cultures as well,
though may be expressed using different strategies which can involve others (e.g., Gómez
et al., 2009; Sedikides et al., 2003; Seih et al., 2013). Additionally, self-enhancement may
also be willfully suppressed in favor of modesty and other self-presentational concerns
(e.g., Brown, 2003; Kurman, 2003). However, people with negative self-conceptions do
not seem to be motivated to self-enhance, but primarily to verify their current, negative
self-views (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012). I discuss these ideas further in the selfverification section.
Self-Enhancement. Self-enhancement represents the need for self-views that are
as positive and favorable as possible, given the constraints of reality (Alicke et al., 2013).
Self-enhancement biases identity formation by selectively seeking out, attending to, and
processing positive self-relevant information, as well as shielding oneself from negative
feedback (Krueger, 1998). In one demonstration of this, Krueger (1998) gave participants
18 trait-descriptive adjectives. Participants were to give four ratings for each adjective:
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(1) how personally descriptive it was, (2) how descriptive it was of the average other, (3)
the personal desirability of the trait to the person, and (4) the social desirability of the
trait. Krueger found that for most traits, the average personal desirability rating of a trait
was higher among those who rated the trait as self-descriptive compared to those who did
not consider the trait as self-descriptive.
In terms of the parent example, the parent would tend to seek out information that
suggests they are a good parent (e.g., telling others about how they handled a situation
with their child that is most likely to elicit positive feedback). For instance, the strict
parent might selectively recount to a friend an instance in which they addressed their
child’s misbehavior in a manner that elicited more appropriate behavior from the child.
The friend may respond to the story with ambiguous or mixed feedback, but the parent
would be motivated to interpret the feedback as being generally positive. Selfenhancement would bias the parent to selectively attend to the words and expressions that
could be interpreted as positive feedback and interpret them as such.
Under the self-enhancement motivation, perceived positive feedback is selectively
remembered and embellished, becoming more positive each time it is recalled. Negative
feedback is reinterpreted as less damning, or may simply be forgotten or ignored (i.e., not
encoded into memory at all; Krueger, 1998). Following the parenting example, when the
parent reflects on the interaction with their friend, they may selectively remember the
most positive elements of their friend’s feedback and remember it as being more positive
than it was (e.g., remembering their friend smiling more broadly than they did or
sounding more impressed than they were). If the friend’s feedback was more overtly
negative, for instance, “in my opinion, that’s way too harsh,” the parent may remember it
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as ambivalent, (e.g., “that would be way too harsh for my kids”), forget the negative
feedback, or fail to remember it at all. Self-enhancement thus biases people to see
themselves more positively than they actually are.
In terms of self-reports, self-enhancement may be related to the aspect of social
desirability termed self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) which reflects overly positive selfreports that respondents genuinely believe (Paulhus, 1984, 2002). This seems quite
similar to self-enhancement. Both are thought to occur predominantly outside of
conscious awareness (e.g., Krueger, 1998; Paulhus, 2002). Theorists in both areas have
argued that the behavior is characterized by a departure from reality and that measures
should have evidence supporting this reality departure (i.e., that high scores on the
measure necessarily reflect untruth rather than exceptional dispositions and behaviors;
Krueger, 1998; Paulhus, 2002). The two constructs may differ in magnitude or scope of
enhancement. Self-deceptive enhancement may reflect a greater magnitude of self
enhancement. People may engage in a fair to moderate amount of self-enhancement such
that if we conceptualized self-enhancement as a continuum starting at 0 (no selfenhancement), they would fall at or near the center of the continuum and would likely
score low on the SDE scale. However, some people may engage in extensive selfenhancement, falling towards the upper end of the continuum and would likely score high
of the SDE scale. Alternatively, self-enhancement and SDE may differ in scope, where
SDE reflects enhancement in a wider range of areas. For example, some people may have
a relatively narrow scope of areas in which they self-enhance, only self-enhancing in
areas that are particularly important to them or those in which they feel particularly
efficacious (Markus, 1983). Such individuals would score low on the SDE scale.
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However, other people may feel broadly efficacious and overly confident in most of their
identities and score high on SDE. Regardless, because the general self-enhancement
motive biases self-beliefs, it can, in turn, bias self-reports such that the accuracy of a
person’s self-report of the attribute of interest is questionable. That is, the information
people report about themselves may reflect the self-enhancement processes that guide
how people see and understand themselves, rather than their true level of the attribute of
interest.
Self-Verification. After self-enhancement, self-verification is considered the next
most influential need-motivated process in forming and maintaining the self-schema that
make up an identity (Guenther et al., 2016). Self-verification represents the need for
coherent, stable self-conception, or view of oneself in a particular identity (e.g., parent;
Swann, 1983), especially identities that are central to one’s self-conception (e.g., English
et al., 2008). Here, a coherent self-conception reflects a broad sense of order among one’s
identities with self-relevant feedback assimilated into and thus affirming one’s self-view
(i.e., how they see themselves; English et al., 2008). This does not necessarily mean that
different identities within a person must be wholly consistent with each other (e.g.,
Linville, 1985). A person may have an athlete identity and a parent identity. Their athlete
self-schema may include ruthless, whereas their parent self-schema includes gentle and
patient. This person would seek feedback that affirms their view of themself as a ruthless
athlete when the athlete self-schema is active and seek feedback that affirms their view of
themselves as a gentle and patient parent when the parent self-schema is active.
Similar to self-enhancing information, people give more attention and credence to
verifying information over non-verifying information (e.g., Swann & Read, 1981a,
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1981b). For example, Seih and colleagues (2013) compared reactions to feedback that
was either positive or negative and verifying or nonverifying. In the first study,
researchers recruited participants online who were either Indian or American (n = 216,
50% Indian), and had them complete a measure of self-perceived sociability. Participants
were then presented with three scenarios, each in which two other people (i.e., two
acquaintances, two friends, or two potential employers) reviewed the participants initial
sociability responses and wrote brief evaluations; one evaluation was moderately positive
(e.g., “I’d say this person probably feels comfortable and at ease around other people”),
the other moderately negative (e.g., “I get the feeling that this person doesn’t seem real
socially confident”). Participants read the evaluations and rated how accurately they
described them on an 11-point scale. There was a significant interaction between selfview and evaluation, such that those with more negative self-views, who saw themselves
as less sociable, rated the negative evaluations as more accurate; the opposite was true for
those with positive self-views, who saw themselves as more sociable. There was also a
significant three-way interaction with culture such that the interaction was stronger for
Americans (p < .001, 𝜂2 = .63) than Indians (p < .001, 𝜂2 = .13). Additionally, there was
a significant interaction between culture and evaluation (p = .03, 𝜂2 = .03) such that
Indian participants rated positive evaluations as more accurate even if non-verifying (p <
.001, 𝜂2 = .10), but Americans did not (p = .25, 𝜂2 < .01). Seih and colleagues (2013)
also conducted a second, similar experiment with Americans and Taiwanese individuals
and found the same significant two-way interaction between self-view and evaluation,
supporting self-verification strivings. However, this second study did not find differences
in the interaction between cultures (i.e., the self-view × evaluation was the same across
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Taiwanese and American participants). The second study also found a significant
interaction between culture and evaluation (p < .001, 𝜂2 = .10) such that American
participants rated positive evaluations as more accurate (p < .001, 𝜂2 = .45), than
Taiwanese participants rated them (p < .001, 𝜂2 = .22).
As was discussed in the self-schema section, identity-congruent information (i.e.,
information that is consistent with that in the activated self-schema) is quickly and
efficiently processed and engenders enhanced recognition and recall (e.g., Markus &
Smith, 1981; Markus & Sentis, 1982). Further, identity-incongruent information (i.e.,
information that differs from that in the active self-schema; Markus & Wurf, 1987) is
rejected. In the face of non-confirming feedback, self-verification, like self-enhancement,
can bias attention, interpretation, and memory in such a way as to lead the individual to
believe that feedback was more confirming than it was.
Research has demonstrated that, for negative self-conceptions, self-verification
tends to be a stronger motivator than self-enhancement; (Swann & Buhrmester, 2012).
That is, an individual with a negative self-view will seek feedback that confirms their
negative self-beliefs rather than seeking positive feedback that would enhance their selfbelief. This may occur because positive feedback would be identity incongruent.
However, while some people see themselves as entirely negative (i.e., their selfconceptions are negative in all their identities), it is also possible to have negative selfconceptions only in specific identities. For example, a person may believe that they are a
lousy sibling and child, an incompetent employee, and a failure as a parent. This person
would then seek negative feedback in these domains, which would confirm their
identities in these roles. A different person might see themselves as a lousy sibling and
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child, but a competent employee, and a generally good parent who struggles with
patience. This person would seek negative but confirming feedback in their roles as a
sibling and child, but seek positive, self-enhancing feedback as an employee and parent.
This difference could manifest in self-report responding such that the first individual
shows little to no overly positive bias in their self-report, and the latter individual shows
enhancement bias only in those areas for which their self-beliefs are positive.
The need for self-verification is likely due to the critical role of self-views in
guiding action and making sense of experience (Swann, 2008). How one sees oneself – in
terms of their activated self-schema or identity – informs how they approach and behave
in situations and make sense of their experience (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman
et al., 2011). For example, two co-workers may each have a significant fear of public
speaking, but one of them has brave as central or core part of their identity. When their
boss asks if either of them would be willing to give a speech addressing a large crowd,
the person who sees themself as brave will be more likely to give the speech while the
other will be more likely to try to avoid it. When the “brave” individual relays the news
of their upcoming speech to other people who know of their phobia, the others will likely
express how dauntless the person is for agreeing to give the speech, thus verifying this
aspect of the person’s identity.
Self-verification thus motivates people to seek and elicit feedback that confirms
their understanding of themselves. Given that people across cultures seem to hold overly
positive self-views (Diener & Diener, 1995), the identities people seek to verify are likely
to be positive. Going back to the strict parent example, a person might selectively recount
to a friend an instance in which being strict with their child facilitated desirable
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subsequent behavior from their child. The friend may respond to the story with
ambiguous or mixed feedback. For instance, they may respond with wide eyes, saying,
“That’s a firm approach; you’re a really stern parent.” The friend may not have
necessarily intended to compliment the parent, but the parent may take it as one,
interpreting their friend’s wide eyes as amazement. Thus, the feedback would be
interpreted as verifying their positive self-view. Self-verification may map to the
Impression Management factor in social desirability. I will explicate this later in the
Identity Theory section.
Again, the processes of identity construction and maintenance are driven by selfenhancement, such that most people’s self-views are largely more positive than is likely
warranted. These overly positive self-views are also reinforced by self-verification, where
people seek affirmation of their self-views from others. Self-enhancement and selfverification motives often work together, engendering identities comprised of overly
positive self-schema that reflect the qualities and behaviors that individuals believe about
themselves. Because self-schemata inform, if not determine, what people are able to
report about themselves, people may present themselves as who they believe they are
(i.e., the identity they self-verify) rather than providing an accurate portrayal of
themselves. If this is the case, people with positive self-views present a version of
themselves in self-report items that is more positive than they likely are.
Identity Theory
Identity Theory is a sociological theory that conceives of identities as social roles
that are incorporated into the self, along with their associated meanings, norms, and
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expectations (Stets & Burke, 2000)3. Here, the cognitive representation of identities
includes an identity standard, which is effectively a prototype, or most common example
of the identity (Stets & Burke, 2000; Brenner et al., 2014). Identity theory advances that
identities are arranged hierarchically within two qualities: the prominence and salience of
each identity (Stets & Burke, 2000; Brenner et al., 2014). Prominence refers to the
importance of the identity to the person and is akin to the psychological centrality of
identity (Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Psychological centrality refers to those identities that
one feels make up the core of who they are, playing a major role in who they are as a
person (Rosenberg, 1979). For example, someone may have an architect identity and a
baker identity. To this person, baking is their passion and their identity as a baker is much
more important to them and is thus more psychologically central than their identity as an
architect. Identity prominence reflects subjective value, as well as internalized cultural
values and social norms. The more important the identity is to a person, the higher its
placement in the prominence hierarchy. The higher the placement, the more that identity
reflects the individual’s aspirational or ideal self (McCall & Simmons, 1978). For
example, the person who has the parent identity and the athlete identity might place more
value on the parent identity, placing the parent identity higher in the prominence
hierarchy than the athlete identity.
Salience is the likelihood that a given situation will be perceived as relevant to
enacting the identity, or the probability the identity will be enacted in the situation. In
broad terms, enacting an identity means engaging in the thoughts and behaviors
associated with the identity. Prominence causally precedes salience, meaning that

3

While this conceptualization of identity is narrower than the one that I discussed previously, it is not
necessarily at odds.
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identities are first more or less important to individuals before they are more or less likely
to be enacted (Brenner et al., 2014). While greater salience is likely to accompany higher
prominence, this is not necessarily so. That is, highly prominent identities are not
necessarily very likely to be enacted. This is because the actual self is constrained by
costs, such as time, money, energy, as well as other relevant expenditures (e.g., Burke,
1980; Brenner, 2017). Going back to the parenting example, the parent may idealize
consistency, but responding to work emails may distract them from consistently making
sure their child turns off the TV after 7:30.
Identity Theory advances that people self-verify by enacting behavior that is
consistent with their identity standard. On one hand, this is in contrast with the previously
discussed view of self-verification, in that Identity Theory does not require interpersonal
feedback for self-verification. However, self-verification may involve both processes
(i.e., independent and interpersonal), especially when considering the biases in identityincongruent feedback. That is, if self-verification were to rely exclusively on feedback
from others to affirm one’s identity it would make little sense that we would see the
biases in attention, interpretation and recall such that the individual perceives their
identity as being verified even when it is not. As such, Brenner and DeLamater (2016)
theorize that self-report items offer an avenue to enact and thus verify one’s identity, and
that doing so does not incur the resource expenditure typically associated with identity
enactment. Going back to the parent whose identity standard includes consistency, but
who finds it difficult to be consistent, the parent might over report their level of
consistency when responding to a survey about parenting styles. For example, the parent
most often may be too tired or distracted to consistently enforce rules but still respond
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with Strongly Agree to an item such as “I consistently enforce the rules established for
my children.”
To some extent, this process of self-verification seems analogous to impression
management (IM), one of the two factors commonly believed to make up social
desirability (Paulhus, 2002). According to Paulhus, impression management involves the
presentation of an overly positive image, including presentation of behaviors “that are so
public and blatant they are not subject to self-deception” (p. 55). Interestingly, Paulhus as
well as other researchers have argued that impression management may be more of a
personality characteristic than a deliberate lie. That is, the tendency to regularly present a
particular positive image of oneself may be an aspect of one’s personality. However, it
may also be an avenue for self-verification. That is, impression management may to some
degree reflect the expression of one’s identity, specifically their ideal self. The questions
asked in impression management scales may align with certain people’s ideal selves (e.g.,
an example item on the IM subscale is, “I always pick up my litter on the street”). If a
question asked about an attitude or behavior that is not part of one’s identity, particularly
not an important identity, one would not use it to self-verify. Thus, some people may
respond to self-report questions as a means of self-verifying, which also expresses itself
as impression management. People who have difficulty enacting their important identities
may be more likely to engage in such impression management (Markus & Wurf, 1987).
Difficulties may arise when people attempt to engage in an identity-relevant behavior but
fail or fall short, such as someone who sees themselves as a cook but has a tendency to
ruin recipes. It may also be difficult to enact identities if one is pressed for money, time,
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or energy. For example, one may see themself as a runner, but lately has not made time
for running in the mornings and feels too tired during the day.
Responding to self-report items in terms of one’s identity – specifically, one’s
ideal self – not only affords the respondent a low-cost opportunity to enact their identity
and self-verify, but also affords them the option to avoid negative affect. Researchers in
Self-Discrepancy theory have proposed that awareness of discrepancies between the
actual and ideal self can elicit negative affect, including feelings of dejection, anxiety,
and depression (Higgins, 1987). The strength of this negative affect corresponds to the
magnitude of the discrepancy. Responding honestly to self-report items may highlight a
discrepancy between one’s ideal and actual selves and engender feelings of sadness or
anxiety. To avoid such feelings, respondents may instead respond in terms of their ideal
selves, thus circumventing the discrepancy and verifying the identity in question.
Brenner and DeLamater (2016) argue that respondents may attempt to avoid
negative affect by reinterpreting questions as inquiries about identity, or the kind of
person one believes themself to be in the relevant domain. Thus, the responses people
provide in surveys and questionnaires may reflect their important identities (i.e., ideal
selves), which may not be consistent with their actual thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
(Brenner, 2017).
To investigate their claim, Brenner and DeLamater (2016) compared the accuracy
of two forms of self-reports, validating each against a more objective measure. The
research design was within-subjects, so all participants completed both forms of selfreport. Participants were students at a large midwestern university; researchers told
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participants that they were interested in the general on-campus activities in which
students engaged, though the actual behavior of interest was exercising.
One form of self-report was in-situ SMS text message reports. Each participant
was instructed to send a text update whenever they began an activity (e.g., exercising at
the university gym) during a five-day period. This in situ reporting was theorized to
attenuate, if not circumvent the self-reflection that is intrinsic to conventional selfreporting. Conventional self-report questions that ask about frequency and extent of
behavior elicit self-reflective responding and the opportunity to reinterpret the question.
For example, a question like, “how many times this week did you exercise in the gym?”
may be reinterpreted as asking, “how many times would a person like you have exercised
in the gym this week?” Conversely, in situ reporting involves respondents reporting only
when they are beginning the activity. This transforms self-reporting one’s behavior from
reflective to active and attenuates reflection on whether one’s answer signifies their
identity.
The other form of self-report was a more traditional, reflective report of the
number of times the student exercised in the university gym, reported in a survey at the
end of the week. At the end of the survey, participants also responded to questions of
identity importance. To measure the importance of exercise identity, students reported
how important “exercise, working out, or playing sports” was to them on a scale from 0
(not at all important) to 10 (extremely important; p. 341). Researchers hypothesized that
identity prominence (i.e., those for whom regular exercise was part of their ideal self)
would be a strong predictor of overreporting in participants, as measured by the
discrepancy between student self-reports and actual gym activity.
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Researchers validated student reports of exercising against the university gym
records, which included the names, student IDs, date, and time that each student entered
the gym. To reduce the likelihood of outdoor exercising and increase the likelihood that
exercise would take place at the university gym, the study was conducted in February
when temperatures ranged from -11°F to 23°F; few participants reported exercising
outside.
Brenner and DeLamater (2016) found that the in-situ reports were more accurate
(i.e., effectively equivalent to gym records) than the reflective self-reports. Further,
identity prominence was a strong predictor of overreporting among non-exercisers. That
is, on a traditional self-report survey, participants for whom exercising was part of their
ideal self were more likely to overreport how much they exercised, compared to
participants for whom exercising was not part of their ideal self. This overreporting of
exercise was hypothesized to serve as an expression of participants’ ideal selves without
incurring the associated time and energy costs. Further, by overreporting, participants
were able to avoid the negative affect of not behaving in line with their ideal selves.
These results suggest that real time in-situ reporting, as opposed to retrospective
reporting, may remove some of the bias that results from respondents’ identities,
specifically their reactive responding in terms of their ideal selves, as they report their
current behavior. Though in-situ methodology such as SMS text messaging may not
always be a feasible option, there may be other ways to attenuate, if not circumvent, the
identity bias. Brenner and DeLamater (2016) suggest that proffering respondents the
chance to “claim the [prominent] identity,” (i.e., express their ideal self) in survey items
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may facilitate more accurate responding to subsequent items about their actual self (p.
349).
This suggestion was supported in a study by Brenner (2017), who used cognitive
interviews to investigate how participants interpret and respond to self-report questions
about religious service attendance (aside from weddings and funerals) overall as well as
within the past week. Cognitive interviews are commonly used to investigate different
steps of the response process (Sudman et al., 1996). In Brenner (2017), participants first
responded to interview questions about religious service attendance, then completed a
self-report survey on a different topic, and then were asked specific follow-up questions
(cognitive probes) regarding their responses about religious service attendance. All
participants selected to participate had self-identified as being religious. Brenner found
that both aspirational and normative religious identities (i.e., ideal and ought religious
selves) prompted inflated initial reports of religious service attendance in nearly 48% of
participants. That is, respondents’ initial reports of how frequently they attended religious
services were higher than what they reported in response to cognitive probes. Participants
frequently cited reasons such as over-sleeping, transportation issues, or schedule conflicts
for not attending church, though they often assured the interviewer that they wanted to go
more and planned to go more, expressing such sentiments as “[i]f I had my way, it would
be every week” (p. 554). Brenner interpreted this as evidence that participants’ initial
reports were more driven by their ideal and ought religious selves than their actual selves.
However, in response to the cognitive probes, participants were able to give more
accurate accounts of their behavior (i.e., their actual self) even in the face of the actual-
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ideal discrepancy. This suggests that after expressing their ideal selves, participants may
have been able to report their actual selves more accurately.
The proposed research extends the studies by Brenner and DeLamater (2016) and
Brenner (2017) by seeking to investigate whether the opportunity to first express one’s
ideal self within a traditional self-report survey engenders more accurate responding
about one’s actual self. In the proposed study, respondents will have the opportunity to
express both their actual and ideal selves (i.e., important identities; the kind of person
they believe themself to be), with the latter serving as a method of self-verification. I
hypothesize that expression of the ideal self could, in a sense, “free them up” to answer
more honestly about their actual selves.
Alternatively, reporting both identities could highlight respondents’ selfdiscrepancies and elicit negative affect. Respondents may try to avoid this negative affect
by providing the same responses for their ideal and actual selves, thus bringing the two
identities into alignment. However, if allowing respondents to first express their ideal
selves results in more accurate actual-self responses (as inferred by an indirect measure),
then allowing for expression of both selves may be a simple way to increase self-report
accuracy.
Through the proposed study I aim to investigate the effect of participants’
reporting their ideal selves prior to reporting their actual selves. Specifically, I seek to
answer four research questions:
1. Does responding first in terms of one’s ideal-self elicit different subsequent
responses in terms of their actual self?
a. Do ideal-self responses statistically differ from actual-self responses?
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b. Are ideal-self responses similar to responses obtained using a
traditional survey format in which respondents are not asked about
their ideal and actual selves?
c. Do actual-self responses differ from responses using traditional survey
response format?
2. Might actual-self responses be more accurate than responses obtained using a
traditional survey format?
3. Are ideal-self responses and control responses on a given topic equally related
the importance of that topic to one’s identity?
4. Are ideal-self responses and control responses equally related to selfdeceptive enhancement and impression management (the two factors of social
desirability).
In the following section (Methods) I will first provide an overview of study
procedures, including an outline of the survey administration. Then I will describe the
experimental manipulation followed by the descriptions of the measures. I will then
provide information on data collection and the sample from which the data were
collected. Finally, I will provide the data analysis outline.

30
Chapter 3: Methods
Procedures
Participants accessed the Qualtrics survey that was comprised of 14 measures:
five self-report scales, five indirect measures (each corresponding to one of the selfreport scales), a measure of identity importance, a social desirability scale, and five
demographic questions. The measures are described below in the Measures section.
Participants were randomly assigned into two conditions (experimental and control) and
administered the self-report scales. All participants were administered all items, the only
difference being that the items in the experimental condition included the manipulation
(described below in manipulation section). Participants were then randomly assigned into
two different conditions (baseline and sensitive) for the indirect measures (the
Unmatched Count Technique, described in Measures section). See Figure 1 for a randomassignments schematic.
Figure 1
Schematic of Participant Assignment to Two Sets of Conditions
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Note: The experimental and control conditions pertain to the five experimental scales.
The baseline and sensitive conditions are the conditions for the indirect measures.
The sequence of administration for the survey scales and randomization is outlined
below.
1. Survey information and informed consent.
2. Random assignment to either the experimental or control condition
a. Overall instructions for the five scales
b. The five experimental scales (presented in random order)
3. Random assignment to either the baseline or sensitive condition for the UCT
a. Overall UCT instructions for the following five sets
b. The five UCT sets in the order of4:
i. Conspiracy mentality
ii. Gender determinism
iii. Immigration
iv. Exercise/physical activity
v. Healthy eating
4. Identity importance measure
5. Measure of SDB
6. Five demographic questions
7. Textbox to express questions, comments, or concerns

4

The format of the survey did not allow for random ordering of the UCT sets. The statements within each
set were randomly ordered.

32
Manipulation
The experimental manipulation involved participants first answering the question
in terms of their ideal self, then in terms of their actual self. All participants were
administered all of the items. The only difference was that participants in the
experimental group responded to each item dually, first in terms of their ideal selves and
then in terms of their actual selves. Participants in the experimental condition were given
a set of instructions preceding the five scales that informed them of the dual responding
(see Appendix A). The instructions for each scale reiterated the dual response instruction
(Appendix B). Both experimental and control items are listed in Appendix B.
Measures
Experimental Measures
There are five scales that were chosen as the experimental measures: The
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire, the Gender Determinism Scale, the Negative
Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale, the Healthy Eating Assessment, and the GodinShepard Physical Activity Questionnaire. These scales were chosen for three main
reasons. The first and second reasons concern the scales addressing topics that are of
social value, relevance, and interest. These qualities were important so as to create a
greater likelihood (1) of asking about things that are important to participants’ identities
and thus their ideal selves, and/or (2) of observing socially desirable responding. Some
participants may publicly endorse favorable views and behaviors (SDR) or see
themselves as people who hold certain beliefs or attitudes (their ideal selves). However,
their actual selves may not hold these views or enact the behaviors.
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The third reason these scales were selected was due to the relative brevity of each
(i.e., one scale has 12 items, the other four scales have six items or fewer). Since
participants will be answering 14 measures (five of which participants in the
experimental condition respond to twice), having few items per measure will hopefully
reduce respondent strain and fatigue and increases chances of participants answering
more thoughtfully and finishing the survey. The total number of responses requested of
participants was 108 in the experimental condition and 78 in the control condition.
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire. This five-item scale was developed to
assess peoples’ general tendency to believe conspiracy theories (Bruder et al., 2013).
Items consist of broad statements about the world through the lens of conspiracy-oriented
views (e.g., “I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are the
result of secret activities.”). Participants report how likely they think that each item is true
on an 11-point scale from 0% (certainly not) to 100% (certain). Items were presented to
participants in random order. Internal consistency in Bruder et al. (2013) was alpha = .84;
from the current study, alpha was = .82.
Gender Determinism Scale. The Gender Determinism Scale is a four-item scale
developed to measure the extent to which a person believes that one’s gender dictates
individual characteristics (i.e., actions, behaviors, and attributes; Tinsley et al., 2015).
Responses are provided on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly don’t believe) to 5 (strongly
believe). Internal consistency of the items in Tinsley et al., (2015) was alpha = .84. In the
current study, items were randomly ordered for each participant. Internal consistency was
alpha = .86.
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The Godin-Shephard Leisure-Time Physical Activity Questionnaire. This
three-item scale was developed to assess physical fitness (Godin, 2011). Participants
report the number of times in an average 7-day period that they do each of three levels of
exercise (strenuous, moderate, mild) for more than 15 minutes. Each category level
includes a brief description (i.e., “heart beats rapidly”, “not exhausting”, and “minimal
effort”, respectively) along with several examples of that level of exercise. Items were
presented to all participants in the same order (minimal, moderate, strenuous).
Healthy Eating Assessment (HEA). The HEA was adapted by the Government
of Northwest Territories (GWNT; 2017) from an 8-item scale (Starting the Conversation,
STC; Paxton et al., 2011) developed to serve as a brief dietary assessment in nondietician primary care and health-promoting settings. The HEA consists of 10 items, and
the scale was modified from three categories (0-2) of the STC to five categories (1-5).
Participants are instructed to average what they ate or drank over the past few weeks and
select an answer for each question. Category labels are specific to the item. Six of the ten
HEA items were used in the current study. The six items were chosen based on having
more common associations with health, (e.g., “How would you rate your overall habits of
eating healthy foods?” “How many times a day did you eat fast/fried food/packaged
snacks high in fat/salt/sugar?”), and thus potentially being subject to identity bias or SDR
because of a desire to appear or view themselves as healthy. Items were randomly
presented to participants. Internal consistency from this study was alpha = .74.
Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale (NATIS). This 12-item measure
was developed to assess attitudes towards immigrants (Varela et al., 2013). Items assess
primarily negative attitudes (e.g., “Immigrants are a burden on American taxpayers” and
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“Immigrants are not as smart as Americans”). Responses are recorded on a five-point
scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Internal consistency from the
original study was alpha = .86; from the current study alpha was = .93.
The Unmatched Count Technique (UCT)
The Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) is an indirect measure that compares the
differences in base rates of responses across two conditions (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2019;
Dalton et al., 1994; Raghavarao & Federer, 1979). Participants are randomly assigned to
two conditions, the baseline and sensitive conditions. The baseline condition includes
four innocuous statements (e.g., “I own or would like to own a pet” “The U.S. education
system could be improved”), one of which should have responses with relatively low
frequency in the general population (e.g., “I go to church at least every Sunday” “I brush
my teeth after every meal”). The sensitive condition includes the four statements from the
baseline condition as well as one additional statement that is sensitive or controversial,
reflecting the topic of interest (e.g., “Overall, I think immigrants do more harm than
good”).
For each set, participants report an integer reflecting how many of the four or five
statements they endorse or that applies to them. Participants do not indicate which of the
statements they endorse. The average number of statements endorsed in the baseline
condition is compared to that of the sensitive condition. Because the two conditions only
differ in the inclusion of the sensitive statement, and participants are randomly assigned
to each condition, the difference between the averages in each condition is used to
estimate and infer the prevalence of the behavior or attitude in the general population.
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That is, the UCT is a group level variable and does not allow for inferences of
endorsement at the individual level.
In the current study, I include five UCT sets, one set for each topic area addressed
by the experimental scales (see Appendix C). That is, in each of the sets in the sensitive
condition, the sensitive statement was relevant to one of the topics in the experimental
scales (e.g., one sensitive statement is “I rarely exercise” which corresponds to physical
activity as measured by the Godin-Shephard Leisure-Time Physical Activity
Questionnaire).
Identity Importance
Following Brenner and DeLamater (2016), I included items aimed at assessing
identity importance. Each item maps to the topics assessed by one of the experimental
scales (see Appendix D). There are seven items that ask about the importance of different
topics to one’s identity from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (extremely important). Topics
consist of gender equality, gender norms, pro-immigrant attitudes, anti-immigrant
attitudes, healthy eating, exercising, and non-conspiracy mentality (there are thus two
items that meant to correspond to the Gender Determinism scale and two items to the
NATIS).
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR – 16)
The BIDR-16 is a 16-item scale (Hart et al., 2015) shortened from the original 40item Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991), developed to measure
the two factors of socially desirable responding. The measure includes eight items to
measure the impression management factor (8 items, e.g., “I never cover up my
mistakes”) and eight items to measure the self-deceptive enhancement factor (8 items,
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e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). Responses are recorded on a Likert scale from
1 (not true) to 7 (very true). Scores are computed by summing responses across items5;
higher scores indicate greater SDR. Average internal consistency reported by Hart et al.
(2015) was alpha = .69 (average alphas for subscales SDE = .68, IM = .71). Internal
consistency from the current study was alpha = .73 (SDE alpha = .65; IM alpha = .68).
The items for the BIDR-16 can be found in Appendix E.
Data Collection & Participants
Data were collected via the Psychology Participant Pool and via bulk email to
students. Participants accessed the survey via Qualtrics. An a priori power analysis using
effect sizes .25 returned needed sample sizes of approximately 181 and 348 for the t- and
z-tests, respectively. A total of 442 individuals completed the survey, of which 359 were
obtained through the psychology participant pool and 83 were obtained through student
bulk email. Missing data, random responding, and outliers were considered by topic. The
specific sample sizes for a scale are reported per analyses. If a participant completed an
identity importance item but not the corresponding scale, their data was excluded from
the analyses for that scale. Data from those who spent a concerningly short length of time
on the page for a given scale were filtered from analyses for that scale. Data were filtered
from analyses if respondents spent less than 15 seconds on the Gender Determinism scale
(both groups), less than 20 seconds on the Conspiracy Mentality scale (both) and HEA
(both), and less than 20 or 25 seconds on the NATIS (control and experimental,
respectively). These amounts of time were selected because they were the lowest

5

Paulhus (1994) recommended dichotomous scoring of the BIDR, adding points to the higher values (i.e.,
6 or 7), such that high response values become more extreme. The present study used continuous scoring,
in line with Hart et al. (2015) and Stöber et al., (2002) who found that continuous scoring engendered
greater reliability than dichotomous.
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reasonable number of seconds that resulted in the smallest loss of participants and kept
the group sizes approximately equal. Outliers on the self-report scales were identified
using Mahalanobis Distance (p < .05), calculated by condition and scale. Responses with
Malahalanobis values greater than or equal to the critical value were inspected. Those
that were found to be unreasonable (i.e., scale responses that contradicted one another)
were excluded from the analyses for that scale. For the Conspiracy Mentality scale,
Gender Determinism scale, and NATIS, there were 2, 3, and 8 such cases, respectively,
for the experimental group and 0, 2, and 2 such cases, respectively, for the control group.
There were no concerning outliers for the Healthy Eating Assessment. Approximately
half of the responses to the Godin Physical Activity scale were outside a reasonable range
(i.e., values greater than or equal to 20). Upon inspection, it was not clear whether this
was due careless, random responding or if respondents misunderstood what they were to
report (i.e., number of times they were physically active vs number of minutes). The
validity of responses to the scale was thus called into question and the data were omitted
from analyses. The corresponding identity importance item and UCT item were also
omitted as they were no longer relevant.
For analyses involving the BIDR-16, cases were filtered by time spent on the
scale, including only those who took at least 60 seconds (n = 381). This amount was
chosen because it was the smallest time that kept the group means on SDE and IM
comparable. A lower time resulted in larger differences between the control and
experimental group means on the subscales. A significant difference between the groups
could confound any subsequent group differences involving the BIDR-16 subscales.
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The mean age for the sample was 19.8 (SD = 2.5); four participants did not
respond. Twenty-four participants reported that they were Hispanic/Latinx, 415 reported
that they were not Hispanic/Latinx, three participants did not respond. The sample was
86.8% white and 76.5% cis-gendered female. The highest level of education for 88.7% of
the sample was “currently in a bachelor’s degree program.” Tables displaying specific
frequencies of the demographics can be found in Appendix F.
Data Analysis Outline
Data analysis followed four phases. All analyses were conducted for each of the
five self-report scales (or their corresponding UCT and identity importance items, where
applicable). For brevity, I will refer to ideal-self responses from the experimental group
as ideal-self or IS responses. I will refer to actual-self responses from the experimental
group as actual-self or AS responses. I will refer to responses from the control group as
control responses.
Phase one consisted of two parts (A and B) which included descriptive statistics
and preliminary analyses. In part A, I examined descriptive statistics for both conditions
for each of the five scales. For the experimental condition I include descriptive statistics
for both ideal and actual selves. In part B I examined whether the experimental and
control groups differed in the measures of identity importance and social desirability. I
compared the groups on identity importance because it is theorized to, in part, drive
overreporting; significantly different ratings of identity importance between the
experimental and control group could confound other response differences between the
groups. I compared the groups on social desirability because later analyses compare the
relationships of self-report scale responses with identity importance and social
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desirability, respectively, between groups; significantly different scores of social
desirability between the experimental and control groups would confound differences
between identity importance and SDR with group differences. I compared experimental
and control groups on their scores of identity importance using a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). I compared the conditions on the two subscales of the BIDR-16
using a split-plot ANOVA with condition as the between subjects factor and subscale and
the between subjects factor.
Phases two through four were aimed at answering the previously laid out research
questions. The analyses are mapped to the research questions in Table 1.
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Table 1
Analyses Mapped to the Relevant Research Questions
No.

RQ

Analysis

Are there statistically significant
differences between ideal-self
responses and actual-self responses?

Paired samples t-tests comparing mean IS and
AS responses for the experimental group.

Are there statistically significant
differences between ideal-self
responses and responses using
traditional survey response format
from the control group?

Independent samples t-tests comparing IS
(experimental group) and control responses.

1c

Are there statistically significant
differences between actual-self
responses from the experimental
group and responses using traditional
survey response format?

Independent samples t-tests comparing AS
(experimental group) and control responses.

2

Are responses from the experimental
condition more accurate than those
from the control condition?

Differences in prevalence between the
experimental and control conditions will be
tested using the z statistic for the difference
between two proportions.

3

Are ideal-self responses and control
responses on a given topic equally
related the importance of that topic to
one’s identity?

Pearson correlation between identity
importance item and responses (ideal-self and
control). Comparison of correlations between
groups using a z-test following an r to z
transformation.

4

Are ideal-self responses and control
responses equally related to selfdeceptive enhancement and
impression management (the two
factors of social desirability).

Pearson correlations between responses
(ideal-self and control) and SDE and IM.
Comparison of correlations using a z-test
following an r to z transformation.

1a

1b

The second phase was meant to answer the first research question (1a, 1b, and
1c). That is, I examined whether responding first in terms of one’s ideal-self elicited
different subsequent responses in terms of their actual self. I did this in three steps. First,
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I compared the means of IS and AS for each scale using paired samples t-tests. Next, I
compared AS means and control means for each scale using independent samples t-tests.
If responding first in terms of one’s ideal-self frees them to respond more accurately
about their actual self, then such actual-self responses may be statistically different from
both ideal-self responses and control responses. Lastly, I compared IS means and control
means for each scale using independent samples t-tests. If people automatically respond
to self-report items in terms of their ideal-selves, then ideal-self responses should be
similar to responses from the control group.
The third phase concerned the second research question, inferring accuracy.
Specifically, I scored the UCT, estimating prevalence overall (i.e., difference between
baseline and sensitive across all participants) and the prevalence within each condition
(i.e., experimental and control). Responses to the UCT are thought to be less subject to
SDR, but responses may still be subject to identity bias such that the prevalence in the
experimental condition could be different from prevalence in the control condition. This
difference should exist to the extent that (1) the true engagement of attitudes and
behaviors is similar across conditions, (2) participants in the control condition (i.e., those
who were not exposed to the initial experimental manipulation) respond to UCT items in
terms of their ideal self, as they are theorized to respond to traditional self-report items,
and (3) for participants from the experimental condition, the distinction between one’s
actual and ideal self remains cognitively active and, given that they have expressed their
relevant ideal selves just prior, they respond more accurately to the UCT. Given that
participants were randomly assigned to the conditions (refer to Figure 1 above), the first
stipulation is likely to hold – there is no reason to suspect systematic differences in actual
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attitudinal or behavioral engagement between the experimental and control conditions,
nor between the baseline and sensitive conditions. Differences in prevalence between the
experimental and control conditions were tested using the z statistic for the difference
between two proportions. This was the only analysis that could be conducted given that
the UCT is a between subjects, group level variable.
Phase four related to identity importance and social desirability and their
respective relationships with responses on the experimental scales. Identity importance
should be related to IS responses. To the extent that people in the control condition
respond to survey items in terms of their ideal-self, identity importance should be equally
related to control responses. I investigated whether identity importance was related to the
respective responses using Pearson’s bivariate correlation for each scale. I then
transformed the coefficients using an r to z transformation and compared them using a ztest statistic.
To the extent that impression management and/or self-deceptive enhancement
bias responses, scores on the respective BIDR-16 subscales should be related to
responses (control and ideal). I investigated this by computing the Pearson correlations
for scores (ideal and control) with the impression management and self-deceptive
enhancement subscales.
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Chapter 4: Results
Phase One.
Descriptive Statistics.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for each scale per group. For the
experimental group, descriptive statistics are displayed for both the ideal and actual-self
responses.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Each Response Set per Scale.
Response

n

M

SD

Min

Max

Skew

Kurt

Conspiracy Mentality
Exp – Ideal
Exp –
Actual
Control

211
212

28.0

10.6

0

50

-0.45

-0.11

33.9

7.4

4

50

-0.32

0.41

32.7

7.7

6

50

-0.76

0.96

Gender Determinism
Exp - Ideal
Exp - Actual
Control

217
202

7.8

3.9

4

20

0.96

0.34

9.1

3.8

4

20

0.45

-0.35

8.1

3.2

4

17

0.52

-0.39

Healthy Eating Assessment
Exp - Ideal
Exp - Actual
Control

213
214

24.2

3.0

15

30

-0.46

0.03

18.3

3.3

10

30

0.18

0.12

19.7

3.4

8

28

-0.19

0.04

Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants
Exp - Ideal
Exp - Actual
Control

201
214

20.9

7.7

12

47

0.99

0.45

23.7

8.7

12

49

0.69

-0.18

22.2

8.8

12

58

1.18

1.51

45
Note. Higher scores indicate greater conspiracy mentality, belief in gender determinacy,
healthier eating, and more negative attitudes towards immigrants, on the respective
scales.
Comparing Conditions on Identity Importance.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for each of the six identity importance
items.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Identity Importance Items
Group

M

SD

Min

Median

Max

Skew

Kurt

"Trusting established news sources"
Experimental

5.6

2.6

0

6

10

-0.32

-0.56

Control

6.1

2.4

0

6

10

-0.40

-0.222

"Advocating for gender equality"
Experimental

7.6

2.5

0

8

10

-1.14

0.78

Control

7.8

2.5

0

9

10

-1.10

0.36

"Maintaining and advocating for gender norms"
Experimental

4.6

3.4

0

5

10

0.08

-1.26

Control

4.6

3.3

0

5

10

0.17

-1.14

"Eating healthy"
Experimental

8.1

2.0

1

8

10

-1.11

1.20

Control

8.2

1.9

0

9

10

-1.29

1.97

"Being welcoming of immigrants"
0
8
10
-0.83

0.20

Experimental

7.4

2.4

Control

7.5

2.3

Experimental

"Protecting American culture from contamination from other
cultures"
2.5
2.8
0
2
10
1.07
0.23

Control

2.7

3.0

0

0

8

2

10

10

-0.81

0.93

0.16

-0.25
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For each of the six identity importance items, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was used to compare scores from experimental and control groups. Normality
was violated for each of the six identity importance questions (see Table 4). Due to the
large sample size and equal group sizes, the results are likely robust to the violation
(Havlicek & Peterson, 1974). All other assumptions were met. No significant differences
were found between the conditions for any of the identity importance questions.
Table 4
Test of Normality of Identity Importance Per Group
Group

Shapiro-Wilk W

df

p

“Trusting established news sources”
Exp

.960

211

< .001

Control

.957

212

< .001

“Advocating for gender equality”
Exp

.855

216

< .001

Control

.828

202

< .001

“Maintaining and advocating for gender norms”
Exp

.918

216

< .001

Control

.924

202

< .001

“Eating healthy”
Exp

.866

213

< .001

Control

.847

213

< .001

“Being welcoming of immigrants”
Exp

.899

201

< .001

Control

.895

214

< .001

“Protecting American culture from contamination from other cultures”
Exp

.828

201

< .001

Control

.836

214

< .001
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Comparing Conditions on Social Desirability.
A 2 × 2 split-plot ANOVA was performed on BIDR-16 scores as a function of
condition and subscale. The within-subjects variable was subscale, with two levels, selfdeceptive enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM). The assumptions of
homogeneity of variance and homogeneity of covariance were met, Box’s 𝑀 = 1.55, 𝐹(3,
26060048.62) = 0.51, 𝑝 = .674. All other assumptions were met. The only significant
effect was the main effect of BIDR-16 subscale [F(1,379) = 83.03, p < .001, η2 = .18].
Scores on IM (M = 33.1, SD= 7.4) were significantly higher than scores on SDE (M =
29.2, SD = 6.9).
Phase Two.
Comparing Ideal and Actual Self Responses.
For each of the four scales I performed a paired samples t-test on the difference
between ideal-self responses and actual-self responses from the experimental group.
Normality was violated for each scale (Table 5). Given the sample size and the
approximately equal sample sizes the results are likely robust to the violation (Havlicek
& Peterson, 1974).
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Table 5
Test of Normality of Response Sets Per Group
Scale
CM

GD

HEA

NAT

Shapiro-Wilk W

df

p

Exp - Ideal

0.979

211

.003

Exp - Actual

0.986

211

.042

Control

0.965

212

< .001

Exp - Ideal

0.874

217

< .001

Exp - Actual

0.948

217

< .001

Control

0.937

202

< .001

Exp - Ideal

0.973

213

< .001

Exp - Actual

0.986

213

.040

Control

0.988

214

.064

Exp - Ideal

0.903

201

< .001

Exp - Actual

0.938

201

< .001

Control

0.899

214

< .001

There was a statistically significant difference between ideal- and actual-self
responses for each scale (see Table 6). Differences on the CM scale, GD scale, and
NATIS had medium effect sizes; differences on the HEA scale showed a large effect size.
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Table 6
Differences Between Ideal and Actual Self Response for the Four Scales.

n

Ideal Self
M(SD)

Actual Self
M(SD)

t

df

p

d

CM

211

28.0(10.6)

33.9(7.4)

-9.51

210

< .001

-0.65

GD

217

7.8(3.9)

9.1(3.8)

-7.64

216

< .001

-0.52

HEA

213

24.2(3.0)

18.3(3.3)

25.58

212

< .001

1.75

NATIS

201

20.9(7.7)

23.7(8.7)

-8.34

200

< .001

-0.59

Scale

Note. Differences in ns are due to missing data and outlier removal.
Comparing Ideal Self and Control Responses.
Then, for each of the four scales, I performed an independent samples t-test
comparing the experimental group’s ideal-self responses with the control group’s
responses. Normality was violated for both groups on each scale except for the control
group on the Healthy Eating Assessment (see Table 5 above). Due to the sample size and
the approximately equal group sizes, the t-test is likely robust to this violation (Havlicek
& Peterson, 1974). The homogeneity of variance assumption was violated for the
Conspiracy Mentality scale and the Gender Determinism scale. For these scales, the
Brown-Forsythe Robust Equality of Means test was used (statistics reflected in the table).
All other assumptions were met. Table 7 shows the results of the inferential test for each
scale.
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Table 7
Differences Between Ideal Self and Control Responses for the Four Scales.
Ideal Self

Control

n

M(SD)

n

M(SD)

t

df

p

d

a

211

28.0(10.7)

212

32.7(7.7)

-5.22

381.95

< .001

-0.50

GDa

217

7.8(3.9)

202

8.1(3.2)

-0.64

410.6

.525

-

HEA

213

24.1(3.1)

214

19.7(3.4)

14.28

430

< .001

1.37

NATIS

201

21.0(7.7)

214

22.2(8.8)

-1.49

420

.137

-

Scale
CM

a

Test statistics, degrees of freedom, and probability values reflect those from the

Brown-Forsythe Robust Tests of Equality of Means. Test statistics are square-roots of the
Brown-Forsythe statistics, which is an F-value.
Ideal-self responses were significantly different from control responses on the
Conspiracy Mentality scale, with a medium effect size, and the Healthy Eating
Assessment, with a large effect size. Ideal-self and control responses were not
significantly different on the Gender Determinism scale nor on the Negative Attitudes
Towards Immigrants Scale.
Comparing Actual Self and Control Responses.
For each scale, I then compared actual-self responses of the experimental group
with the control group’s responses using independent samples t-tests. Normality was
violated for both groups for each scale except for the control group on the Healthy Eating
Assessment (see Table 5 above). The homogeneity of variance assumption was violated
for the Gender Determinism scale. For this scale, the Brown-Forsythe Robust Equality of
Means test was used (statistics reflected in the table). All other assumptions were met.
Table 8 shows the results of the t-test for each scale.
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Table 8
Differences Between Actual Self and Control Responses for the Four Scales.
Actual Self
Scale

Control

n

M(SD)

n

M(SD)

t

df

p

d

CM

211

33.9(7.4)

212

32.7(7.7)

1.53

422

.126

-

GDa

217

9.1(3.8)

202

8.1(3.2)

3.06

413.2

.002

0.23

HEA

213

18.3(3.3)

214

19.7(3.4)

4.12

425

< .001

-0.40

NATIS

201

23.7(8.7)

214

22.2(8.8)

1.70

413

.091

-

a

Test statistics, degrees of freedom, and probability values reflect those from the

Brown-Forsythe Robust Tests of Equality of Means. Test statistics are square-roots of the
Brown-Forsythe statistics, which is an F-value.
Actual-self responses were significantly different from control responses on the
Gender Determinism scale and the Healthy Eating Assessment scale. Effects sizes were
small in both cases. Actual self and control responses were not significantly different on
the Conspiracy Mentality Scale nor on the Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale.
Taken all together, the mean of ideal-self responses on the Conspiracy Mentality
scale was significantly lower than the mean for control responses; the means of actualself and control responses did not significantly differ. Responses to the Gender
Determinism scale followed the hypothesized pattern such that the actual-self mean was
significantly higher than the mean for control responses, but the means for ideal-self and
control responses did not differ. For the Healthy Eating Assessment, the mean for idealself responses was significantly lower than the mean for control responses which was in
turn significantly lower than the mean of actual-self responses. For the Negative
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Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale, neither the ideal nor the actual-self responses
differed from control responses.
Phase Three.
Overall UCT Prevalence.
For each UCT item, the mean for the baseline condition was subtracted from the
mean of the sensitive condition (across the entire sample). I also compared the baseline
and sensitive conditions for each scale using Pearson’s chi-squared test of independence,
which was significant for all but the UCT corresponding to the Negative Attitudes
Towards Immigrants Scale. Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics for the baseline and
sensitive groups per scale, as well as the chi-square and p-values.
Table 9
UCT Descriptives and Inferential Statistics per Scale.

CM

GD

HEA

NATIS

n

M(SD)

Min

Max

Sensitive

216

3.4(0.7)

2

5

Baseline

216

3.1(0.6)

1

4

Sensitive

213

3.4(0.7)

1

5

Baseline

209

2.9(0.5)

1

4

Sensitive

221

3.2(0.6)

1

5

Baseline

214

3.0(0.4)

2

4

Sensitive

220

2.5(0.7)

1

5

Baseline

215

2.4(0.7)

1

4

𝝌𝟐

p

25.73

< .001

119.26

< .001

27.84

< .001

6.65

.248

Comparing UCT Prevalence Between Conditions.
The prevalence estimates were also compared between experimental and control
groups for each scale. I analyzed whether there was a significant difference between the
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prevalence estimates for the two conditions using the z statistic for the difference between
two proportions. Proportions were the respective prevalence estimates for the
experimental and control groups, computed as the difference between the means of the
sensitive and baseline conditions for each scale. Table 10 displays the proportions
(prevalence estimates) and comparisons for the experimental and control groups. There
was no significant difference in prevalence between the experimental and control
conditions for any of the four scales.
Table 10
Prevalence Comparisons Between Experimental and Control.
95% CI
Scale

Experimental

Control

z

p

LB

UB

CM

0.32

0.28

0.78

.218

-0.05

0.12

GD

0.57

0.57

-0.01

.503

-0.09

0.09

HEA

0.21

0.21

0.13

.450

-0.07

0.08

NATIS

0.15

0.12

0.96

.168

-0.03

0.09

Phase Four.
Relationships of Scores with Identity Importance, SDE, and IM.
Identity importance should be related to ideal self scores. If participants in the
control group respond in terms of their ideal selves, control scores should also be related
to identity importance. I examined the Pearson bivariate correlations of each group of
scores (ideal and control) with identity importance.
To assess the extent to which SDR might bias responding, correlations were
computed between self-report scores (ideal or control) and each of the BIDR-16
subscales (SDE and IM). The respective correlations with SDE and IM were compared
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between ideal and control. Table 11 displays the correlations between self-report scores
(ideal self or control) and Identity Importance, Self-Deceptive Enhancement, and
Impression Management.
Table 11
Correlations of Scores with Identity Importance, SDE, and IM.
Ideal
r

p

Control
n

r

p

n

Conspiracy Mentality
Identity Importance

-.07

.297

211

-.10

.153

212

SDE

-.11

.134

182

-.05

.501

189

.06

.409

182

-.06

.413

189

IM

Gender Determinism
Identity Importance 1

-.43***

< .001

216

-.28***

< .001

202

Identity Importance 2

.05

.498

217

.06

.377

202

SDE

.14

.061

187

.18*

.014

181

IM

.18*

.012

187

.03

.728

181

< .001

213

Healthy Eating Assessment
Identity Importance

.33***

< .001

213

.52***

SDE

-.04

.607

186

.18*

.012

188

IM

-.12

.117

186

.02

.787

188

Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants
Identity Importance 1

-.68***

< .001

201

-.71***

< .001

214

Identity Importance 2

.48***

< .001

201

.61***

< .001

214

SDE

.16*

.036

175

.11

.136

189

IM

.23**

.002

175

.02

.817

189

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Comparing Correlations with Identity Importance Between Groups. I then
examined the similarity of the correlations between the score groups by transforming the
coefficients using an r to z transformation and comparing them using a z-test. For
Conspiracy Mentality scores, the negative correlation with identity importance was
significantly smaller for ideal self scores (experimental group; r = -.07, p = .297, n = 211)
than for control group scores (r = -.10, p = .153, n = 212), Z = -8.26, p < .001. However,
the correlations with identity importance are negligible for both ideal and control scores.
The negative correlation with the first gender identity importance item was
significantly larger for ideal-self scores (experimental group; r = -.43, p < .001, n = 216)
than for control group scores (r = -.28, p < .001, n = 202), Z = -1.75, p = .040. The
positive correlation with the second gender identity importance item did not significantly
differ between groups, Z = -0.16, p = .435. Correlations with the second gender identity
importance item are negligible for both ideal and control scores.
The positive correlation with the healthy eating identity importance item was
significantly smaller for ideal-self scores (experimental group; r = .33, p < .001, n = 213)
than for control group scores (r = .52, p < .001, n = 213), Z = -2.44, p = .007. The
negative correlation with the first immigration identity importance item was not
significantly different between groups, Z = 0.51, p = .305. The positive correlation with
the second immigration identity importance item was significantly smaller for ideal-self
scores (experimental group; r = .33, p < .001, n = 213) than for control group scores (r =
.52, p < .001, n = 213), Z = -1.78, p = .038.
Comparing Correlations with SDE and IM Between Groups. I compared the
correlations between ideal and control by transforming the coefficients using an r to z
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transformation and comparing them using a z-test. There were no significant differences
between ideal and control for the correlation between Conspiracy Mentality scores and
SDE (Z = -0.61, p = .272) or IM (Z = 1.17, p = .122), nor between the Gender
Determinacy scores and SDE (Z = -0.44, p = .33) or IM (Z = 1.51, p = .065).
For scores on the Healthy Eating Assessment, there was a significant difference
between the correlations of SDE and ideal scores (r = -.04, p = .607, n = 186) and of SDE
and control (r = .18, p = .012, n = 186), Z = -2.13, p = .017. Scores on the HEA did not
significantly differ in their relationship with IM, Z = -1.30, p = .097.
Scores on the Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants Scale did not significantly
differ across groups in their relationship with SDE, Z = 0.48, p = .315. The relationship
between ideal scores and IM was significantly larger (r = .23, p = .002, n = 175) than the
relationship between control scores and IM (r = .02, p = .817, n = 189), Z = 2.03, p =
.021.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
The present research was based on findings from Brenner (2014, 2017) and
Brenner and DeLamater (2016) who theorized that people respond to survey items in
terms of their ideal selves. The purpose of the present research was to investigate whether
having participants respond first in terms of their ideal selves engendered differences in
subsequent responding in terms of their actual selves. Specifically, this study aimed to
answer four research questions. Below I summarize the results corresponding to each
research question. Specifically, I identify the results that aligned with the theory, those
that did not, and their implications. I then discuss some pertinent limitations and possible
directions for future research.
Summary of Findings
Research Question One
This research question concerned whether ideal and actual-self responses were
significantly different from each other (1a) and from responses using traditional survey
format (i.e., control group responses; 1b and 1c). If people respond to self-report items in
terms of their ideal selves, then the experimental group’s ideal-self responses should not
significantly differ from the control group’s responses. If having respondents first
respond in terms of their ideal-self frees them to then respond more accurately about their
actual self, actual-self responses (experimental group) should significantly differ from the
control group’s responses, assuming respondents in the control group reinterpret
questions in terms of identity and respond in terms of their ideal selves.
The results from the present study returned statistically significant differences
with moderate to large effect sizes between ideal and actual-self responses from the
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experimental group. However, whether there was a statistically significant difference
between control and either ideal or actual responses depended on the scale.
Specifically, the pattern of differences on the Gender Determinism scale matched
what was expected (i.e., ideal and control were not significantly different, actual and
control were). The pattern of differences on each of the other four scales was more
varied. Such results could be due to the nature of the construct, that is, whether the
construct is an attitude or behavior. Past research measured exercise (Brenner &
DeLamter, 2016) and church attendance (Brenner, 2017). The current study included
attitude measures, which can differ from measures of behavior in the response process
(e.g., Sudman et al.,1996 ). The difference in response processes may engender
differences in how identity influences their responses. The salience of the construct may
be influential. That is, participants may generally attend more to certain behaviors or
attitudes than others. For example, people give some degree of attention to selecting what
to eat every day. Conversely, undergraduate students may less frequently attend to their
attitudes on immigrants. Importance of the construct to participant’s identities may also
be a source of influence. Constructs with greater identity importance may be more likely
to show significant deviations of actual-self responses from control responses. Indeed,
compared to the highest possible score of identity importance (i.e., 10), the means were
high for the healthy eating identity importance item (M = 8.1, SD = 2.0) and the first
gender identity importance item (M = 7.7, SD = 2.5)6, and actual-self means for both
differed significantly from control means in the expected direction. The first immigration

6

These means and standard deviations reflect identity importance across groups, as the groups did not
significantly differ on identity importance.
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identity importance item also has a high importance mean (M = 7.5, SD = 2.4), but the
control mean did not significantly differ from actual or ideal self means.
Results may also be attributable to an anchoring effect of one’s ideal self. That is,
people may interpret survey items to ask about the kind of person one is, but rather than
responding in terms of their ideal selves, their ideal selves may anchor survey responses.
Anchoring refers to initial information biasing one’s subsequent judgements (Bazerman
& Moore, 2012). For participants in the control group, their ideal selves may have
provided a starting point for a response, but students may then adjust their response to
better reflect how they believe themselves to be (i.e., their actual selves) such that their
responses tended to fall between their ideal and actual selves. Indeed, the means for the
control group were between the means for the ideal and actual-self responses for all four
scales (see Table 12).
Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations per Scale for Each Responses Set
Ideal
M(SD)

Control
M(SD)

Actual
M(SD)

CM

28.0(10.7)***

32.7(7.7)

33.9(7.4)

GD

7.8(3.9)

8.1(3.2)

9.1(3.8)**

24.1(3.1)***

19.7(3.4)

18.3(3.3)***

21.0(7.7)

22.2(8.8)

23.7(8.7)

Scale

HEA
NATIS

Note. Asterisks denote significant difference from control.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
If control responses were anchored by one’s ideal self, we might expect control
means to fall somewhere between ideal and actual self means. Depending on the
construct, control means could fall closer to either the ideal or actual self mean or fall

60
more evenly in the center. The greater the disparity between ideal and actual selves, the
more likely that control responses significantly differ from both ideal and actual-self
responses. This is seen in with the Healthy Eating Assessment; the control mean differs
significantly from both ideal and actual self means. However, the mean difference
between ideal and control is larger than that between actual and control. Because food
selection is likely to be rather salient in one’s everyday life, the adjustment towards
actual and away from ideal may be easier. This may especially be the case with
undergraduate students for whom unhealthy eating is the norm perhaps even part of the
“college experience.”
Research Question Two.
This research question concerned whether actual-self responses from the
experimental group were more accurate than those of the control group. Additionally, this
research question concerned whether cognitively distinguishing between one’s ideal and
actual-self engendered greater accuracy when responding to subsequent items. To answer
this question, I employed an indirect measure called the Unmatched Count Technique
(UTC), a group-level measure used to infer the prevalence of a construct.
When comparing the baseline and sensitive conditions across all participants,
there were statistically significant differences for the conspiracy, gender, and healthy
eating UCT sets, but not for the UCT set corresponding to the Negative Attitudes
Towards Immigrants Scale. This indicates that the prevalence estimates for conspiracy,
gender, and healthy eating are unlikely due to chance.
When examining baseline-sensitive differences (prevalence values) between
experimental and control groups, none were significant. There are at least two ways to
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interpret this. One interpretation is that the UCT is a technique to circumvent socially
desirable responding and thus reflect a relatively unbiased prevalence estimate7 to which
one can compare self-report scale means and glean the degree of dishonest responding
(i.e., greater difference between UCT prevalence and self-report scale mean)8. Thus,
prevalence estimates for the experimental and control groups should be similar because
neither are affected by SDR. However, to the extent that the UCT can circumvent SDB
but not any form of identity bias, there should be a difference between the experimental
and control conditions if the experimental manipulation engenders greater accuracy. That
is, if people’s responses to the UCT are still affected by their important identities, the
experimental condition, having previously expressed their relevant ideal selves, should
have a UCT prevalence that significantly differs from that of the control group, if the
experimental manipulation engenders greater accuracy. The other interpretation is thus
that the experimental manipulation does not engender greater accuracy. However, due to
limited comparisons, conclusions about the efficacy of the experimental manipulation on
bolstering accuracy is equivocal. Additional research is needed using a measure of
accuracy that affords comparisons between the accuracy estimate and the corresponding
self-report scales. Specifically, to the extent that responding first in terms of one’s idealself frees participants to respond more honestly about their actual self, the accuracy
estimate for the experimental group should be similar to and thus reflect their self-report
scale mean but the control group’s accuracy estimate should be less similar to their selfreport scale mean.

7

Here I use unbiased to mean free of social desirability bias; I am not referring to the property of an
estimate in the measurement sense.
8
This difference is not literal because the two measures have different scales.
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Research Question Three.
This research question concerned whether scores (control or ideal) on a given
topic were related to the importance of that topic to one’s identity, and whether this
relationship was similar between the control and ideal self groups. Results indicate that
this too, at least in part, depended on the scale and the identity importance item.
Identity importance should be related to IS responses. Scores were significantly
related to identity importance in all but two cases – the conspiracy identity importance
item and the second of the gender identity importance items. These two identity
importance items may have failed to reflect the intended construct and thus may not
reflect the importance of the construct to respondents’ identity. I will discuss this matter
further in the limitations section.
If people in the control condition respond to survey items in terms of their ideal
self, identity importance should be equally related to control responses. Four of the
relationships with identity importance were significantly different between groups,
suggesting differences in the influence of identity on responding. Interestingly, the
correlation with identity importance was stronger for the control group for all but the first
gender identity importance item. For that item, the correlation with ideal self scores was
stronger than that with control scores. This may have to do with the sample being 76.5%
female. That is, in their ideal-self expressions women may be more strongly opposed to
the determinacy of gender than in their actual-self expressions.
For the conspiracy mentality, healthy eating, and both immigration identity
importance items, the correlation with control scores was stronger than that with ideal
self scores. This could be an artifact of participants responding to identity importance
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items after responding to the scale items. Those in the experimental condition may have
attempted to reduce any negative affect associated with the highlighted discrepancy
between their ideal and actual selves by reporting lower identity importance. Their
identity importance reports were not so low as to elicit a significant difference between
the groups, however; recall there were no significant differences between means for any
of the identity importance items. The mean identity importance ratings for the conspiracy,
first gender determinism, the healthy eating, and the first and second immigration items
for the experimental group (M = 5.6, 7.60, 8.03, 7.34, 2.46, respectively) were slightly
lower than those for the control group (M = 6.1, 7.83, 8.15, 7.55, 2.71, respectively).
In sum it appears that identity importance is related to responding, often more
strongly for the control responses than for ideal-self responses. This may reflect the
influence of respondents’ ideal selves on their responding.
Research Question Four.
This research question concerned the extent to which scores (ideal and control)
were each related to impression management and self-deceptive enhancement. There
were only three significant correlations with SDE and two with IM. No correlations were
significant for both groups for either subscale. The inconsistent correlations with the
BIDR-16 subscales taken with the more consistent and stronger correlations with identity
importance suggest that the influence of identity and SDR are unlikely to be the same
phenomenon. Further, it may be that identity is influential in responding across a wider
range of people and/or topics than is social desirability.
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Summary of Limitations and Future Directions.
The current study had several pertinent limitations. To begin, the UCT is a grouplevel variable, only affording inferences of prevalence based on differences between
groups. As such it did not afford comparisons that would more definitively inform
whether the experimental manipulation improved self-report accuracy. The UCT does not
enable estimations of the accuracy of individual responses. Future research should
employ objective behavioral measures, the implicit association test, or other techniques
that might better reveal the effects on self-report accuracy after first expressing one’s
ideal self.
Additionally, at least two of the identity importance items seemingly failed to
reflect the importance of the identity intended to be measured by each of the items. The
identity aspect item that corresponded to the CM scale was, “trusting established news
sources” (M = 5.8, SD = 2.5). This item may not sufficiently capture or reflect one’s
identity pertaining to endorsing or denouncing conspiracy theories. Indeed, its
correlations with CM responses, though in the desired direction, were negligible and not
statistically significant (for ideal and control, r = -.10, p = .153; for actual, r = -.05, p =
.470). The wording of the second identity importance item meant to correspond to the
Gender Determinism scale may have been misinterpreted by participants. The item was
meant to assess the importance of maintaining gender norms and roles. The first item
inquired about the importance of advocating for gender equality to one’s identity. As
such, the first and second items should be negatively correlated but they were not
(experimental, r = .18, p = .007; control, r = .17, p = .016). Additionally, correlations of
the second gender identity importance item with responses on the Gender Determinism
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scale are negligible (ideal r = .05 , p = .498; actual r = -.01 , p = .855; control r = .06 , p =
.377). Because of the above outlined issues with the conspiracy and second gender
identity importance items, their lack of significant relationship with responses on the
corresponding scales makes sense. Further research is needed to more clearly investigate
the link between identity importance and self-report bias of attitudes and behaviors. This
research should include more stringent, theory informed development of the identity
importance items.
Further research is needed to untangle the extent to which a person’s ideal-self
anchors their responses. It could be that, at least for some constructs, peoples’ ideal
selves anchor their responses, and people adjust their subsequent responses to better
reflect how they believe that they actually think and act. However, adjustments from
anchors in general can be insufficient, and judgments are often more biased toward the
anchor than reflective of the accurate value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This may
explain why the control responses were between ideal and actual-self responses. For
example, questions about gender determinism may activate one’s identity as a feminist.
This identity standard might include the belief that gender has little to no determination in
one’s abilities, the equivalent of a 1 on the scale. However, the respondent may actually
feel that gender is somewhat deterministic, about a 4 on the scale. In the experimental
condition, explicitly responding in terms of ideal and actual selves may help this person
distinguish between their two responses, responding with a 1 for their ideal self and a 4
for their actual self. If this person were in the control group, however, their identity as a
feminist may anchor them towards the strongly do not believe end of the scale, but their
actual feelings cause them to adjust their response such that they provide a 2 on the scale.
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Thus, their answer in the control condition would be between their ideal and actual-self
responses were they in the experimental condition.
Future research might also include measures of participants’ self-views in the area
of interest in order to inspect the difference in response biases between participants with
positive and negative self-views. Since people with positive self-views in an area are
more likely to self-enhance in that area, such individuals may provide responses that are
more biased towards their ideal selves. Conversely, those with less positive or more
negative self-views in an area may provide responses that show little bias towards their
ideal selves.
Finally, not all self-knowledge is available to conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh,
2017). People are not always aware of their behaviors, reasons for doing things, or
attitudes due to behavioral automaticity, misattribution, memory errors, heuristics, or
other non-conscious influences (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Kahneman, 2011).
Additionally, self-knowledge may be inherently biased if subject to motivated processes
such as self-enhancement and self-verification. For these reasons, it is of upmost
importance to investigate ways to effectively reduce self-report bias and bolster reliable
and accurate responding.
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Appendix A
General Instructions for the Experimental Condition
People often subconsciously respond to questions about themselves in terms of their ideal
self. One's ideal self reflects how they may be at their best, how they wish they were, or
how they desire to be. For most people their ideal self is different from their actual self
(how they actually are in terms of their every-day thoughts, feelings, and actions).
For the next five sets of items, you will be asked to respond to each item in two different
ways. First, respond to the item in terms of your ideal self.
Then respond to that same item in terms of your actual self.
Example:
For a given item with a scale from 1 to 5, I might respond with a "2" in terms of my ideal
self, and a "4" in terms of my actual self.
The instructions for each item set will specify whether to respond as your ideal or actual
self and indicate places for you to do so.
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Appendix B
Experimental Self-Report Scales
Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire
Figure B1
Experimental Instructions and Example Response Scale
For each of the statements below, please use the rating scales provided to indicate how likely it is
in your opinion that the statement is true. First respond in terms of your ideal self, then respond
in terms of your actual self. Remember that there are no “objectively” right or wrong answers
and that we are interested in your personal opinion.

Figure B2
Control Instructions and Example Response Scale
For each of the statements below, please use the rating scales provided to indicate how likely
it is in your opinion that the statement is true. Remember that there are no “objectively” right
or wrong answers and that we are interested in your personal opinion.

1. I think that many very important things happen in the world, which the public is
never informed about.
2. I think that politicians usually do not tell us the true motives for their decisions.
3. I think that government agencies closely monitor all citizens.
4. I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the
result of secret activities.
5. I think that there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions.
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Gender Determinism Scale
Figure B3
Experimental Instructions and Example Response Scale
For the following items, indicate the extent to which you believe each statement.
First respond in terms of your ideal self, and then respond in terms of your actual self.

Figure B4
Control Instructions and Example Response Scale
For the following items, indicate the extent to which you believe each statement.

1. A person’s gender is something basic about them that determines how they will
act.
2. Gender basically determines and individuals behaviors.
3. There is not much people can do to really change how they will act because of
their gender.
4. Gender basically determines an individual’s attributes.
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Godin Leisure Time Activity Scale9
Figure B5
Experimental Instructions and Example Response Scale
During a typical 7-Day period (a week), indicate the number of times, on average, you do the
following kinds of exercise for more than 15 minutes during your free time by writing the
number in the box to the right. First, respond in terms of your ideal self. Then respond in terms
of how you actually are.

Figure B6
Control Instructions and Example Response Scale
During a typical 7-Day period (a week), indicate the number of times, on average,
you do the following kinds of exercise for more than 15 minutes during your free
time by writing the number in the box to the right.

Items:
o Strenuous exercise (heart beats rapidly; e.g., running, jogging, hockey, football,
soccer, squash, basketball, cross country skiing, judo, roller skating, vigorous
swimming, vigorous long distance bicycling).
o Moderate exercise (not exhausting; e.g., fast walking, baseball, tennis, easy bicycling,
volleyball, badminton, easy swimming, alpine skiing, popular and folk dancing).
o Mild/light exercise (minimal effort; e.g., gentle yoga, archery, fishing from river
bank, bowling, horseshoes, golf, snow-mobiling, easy walking).
9

The set of textboxes appeared to the right of each form of exercise.
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Healthy Eating Assessment10
Figure B7
Experimental Instructions and Example Response Scales
For the next set of items, average what you ate or drank over the past few weeks and select the
most appropriate answer for each item. First respond in terms of your ideal self, and then respond
in terms of your actual self.
Question 1:

Questions 2-6:

Figure B8
Control Instructions and Example Response Scales
For the next set of items, average what you ate or drank over the past few
weeks and select the most appropriate answer for each item.
Question 1:

Questions 2-6:

10

For questions 2-4 and 6, the scale labels were more specific to the question, specifying either times or
servings.
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Items:
1. How would you rate your overall habits of eating healthy foods?
2. How many times a day did you eat fast/fried foods or packaged snacks high in
fat/salt/sugar? R
3. How many servings (1 serving = ½ cup) of fresh, frozen, or dried fruit did you eat
each day?
4. How many servings of fresh, frozen or dried vegetables did you eat each day?
5. How many regular soda, sweet tea, juice, energy/sport drinks, sweetened-coffee,
or other sugar sweetened beverages did you drink each day? R
6. How many times a day did you eat regular (not low-fat) snack chips or crackers? R
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Negative Attitudes Towards Immigrants
Figure B9
Experimental Instructions and Example Response Scales
For the following items, indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement. First
respond in terms of your ideal self, and then respond in terms of your actual self.

Figure B10
Control Instructions and Example Response Scales
For the following items, indicate the extent to which you agree with each
statement.

Items:
1. Immigrants should be given the same rights as native citizens.
2. Immigrants do not have valid reasons for leaving their native country.
3. Immigrants in large groups are dangerous.
4. Immigrants bring the problems of their native country to America.
5. Immigrants are a burden on American tax payers.
6. Allowing people to immigrate to the United States is a bad idea.
7. Immigrants never want to return to their native/home country.
8. Immigrants’ culture(s) dilutes American culture.
9. Immigrants are a threat to national security.
10. Immigrants are not as smart as Americans.
11. Immigrants get preferential treatment compared with citizens.
12. There are too many immigrants in the United States.
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Appendix C
Unmatched Count Technique
Instructions:
You will now be shown five sets of statements. For each set, count the number of
statements that apply to you or that you agree with. DO NOT report the specific items.
Instead, report the NUMBER of statements with which you agree in the textbox below
the set.
Figure C1
Sensitive UCT - Conspiracy

Figure C2
Baseline UCT - Conspiracy

75

Figure C3
Sensitive UCT - Gender

Figure C4
Baseline UCT - Gender
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Figure C5
Sensitive UCT - Exercise

Figure C6
Baseline UCT - Exercise
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Figure C7
Sensitive UCT – Healthy Eating

Figure C8
Baseline UCT - Healthy Eating
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Figure C9
Sensitive UCT – Immigration

Figure C10
Baseline UCT - Immigration
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Appendix D
Identity Importance Items
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Appendix E
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, 16-item

1
Not true

2

3

4
Somewhat

5

6

7
Very true

Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE)-8
1

R

I always know why I like things.

2
3

R

4
5

I have not always been honest with myself.

It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
I never regret my decisions.

R

I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon
enough.

6

I am a completely rational person.

7

I am very confident of my judgments.

8

R

I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
Impression Management (IM)-8

9

R

10

I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
I never cover up my mistakes.

11

R

There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.

12

R

I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.

13

R

I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.

14

When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.

15

I never take things that don't belong to me.

16

I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
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Appendix F
Demographics
Table F1
Frequencies for Race
Race

N

American Indian or Alaska Native

4

Asian

37

Black or African American

32

Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander

6

White

384

Othera

10

Missing

4

Note: This item was “select all that apply” so the total exceeds the n of the total sample.
a

Of respondents who selected Other, test responses are as follows: Hispanic (n = 1), Irish

(n = 1), Middle Eastern (n = 3), Russian (n = 1), and Prefer not to answer (n = 1).

Table F2
Frequencies for Gender Identification
Gender Identity
Girl/Woman

N
338

Transgender Girl/Woman

0

Boy/Man

94

Transgender Boy/Man

1

Gender fluid or non-binary

7

Other

1

Missing

1
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Table F3
Highest Levels of Education in the Sample
Education Status
Currently in a Bachelor’s degree program

N

%

392

88.7

Bachelor’s degree
Currently in a graduate degree or
certificate program
Graduate degree or certificate

0

0

38

8.6

9

2

Missing

3

.7

442

100

Total
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